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IMF	‘doves’	versus	German	‘hawks’?	The	Fund	and
Europe’s	politics	of	austerity
The	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	has	a	major	role	in	promoting	‘sound’	economic	policies.	But	as
Ben	Clift	writes,	there	have	been	important	evolutions	in	the	IMF’s	economic	ideas	since	the	global
financial	and	Eurozone	crises.	The	IMF	is	now	often	at	odds	with	some	European	leaders	over	key
issues,	undermining	the	notion	that	economic	policy	can	be	viewed	as	a	purely	technocratic	and
scientific	undertaking,	and	reducing	the	IMF’s	impact	on	policy	in	Europe.
Discussion	at	the	IMF/World	Bank	Spring	Meetings	at	the	IMF	Headquarters	April	22,	2018,	Credit:	IMF	Staff	Photo/Stephen	Jaffe
(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
The	recent	IMF	and	World	Bank	Spring	meetings	with	finance	ministers	and	central	bankers	are	one	key	forum
where	the	IMF	performs	its	mandated	role	as	conduit	of	international	economic	co-ordination,	and	its	self-appointed
role	as	global	arbiter	of	‘sound’	economic	policy.	Christine	Lagarde	recently	set	out	the	IMF’s	policy	priorities,	offering
some	pointed	messages	for	European	policy-makers	about	how	to	improve	economic	growth	and	stability	on	the
continent.	Continuing	a	now	well-established	IMF	tradition,	Lagarde	implored	Germany	to	‘use	its	excess	savings	to
boost	its	growth	potential’,	highlighting	additional	growth-enhancing	opportunities	for	‘investments	in	physical	and
digital	infrastructure.’
As	this	indicates,	amidst	the	(at	best	partial)	resolution	of	the	Eurozone	crisis,	there	is	considerable	daylight	between
IMF	policy	recommendations	and	the	views	on	appropriate	economic	policy	emanating	from	the	German
Government,	other	European	fiscal	hawks,	and	key	European	institutions,	notably	the	European	Commission	and
European	Central	Bank.
The	IMF	seeks	to	influence	and	shape	the	European	economic	policy	debate,	urging	more	activist	domestic
economic	policies	in	support	of	growth,	and	to	strengthen	the	systemic-risk	reducing	capacity	of	the	Eurozone
architecture,	thus	expanding	European	governments’	policy	space.	Counter-cyclical	policy	can,	the	IMF	underlines,
be	hugely	significant	in	reducing	the	losses	in	output	arising	from	recessions	and	economic	crisis.	The	positive	role	of
public	investment	and	fiscal	policy	in	boosting	economic	growth	is	consistently	underlined	–	especially	for	advanced
economies	enjoying	‘fiscal	space’.
Not	your	grandmother’s	IMF
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As	I	detail	in	my	new	book,	there	have	been	important	evolutions	in	Fund	economic	ideas	since	the	eruption	of	the
global	financial	and	Eurozone	crises.	These	shifts	in	Fund	thinking	have	made	for	more	lively	debates	within	the
European	politics	of	austerity,	with	the	Fund’s	post-crash	views	on	fiscal	policy	efficacy	and	conduct,	and	on	the	size
and	shape	of	firewalls	and	financial	backstops	required	for	effective	financial	stabilisation,	increasingly	at	odds	with
key	European	players.
IMF	claims	to	legitimate	economic	knowledge	hinge	on	generating	a	perception	that	economic	policy	decision	is	a
technical,	scientific	process.	This	is	important	for	Fund	authority,	for	its	views	to	gain	‘traction’,	and	be	taken	up.	The
IMF’s	quest	for	‘traction’	sees	it	attempt	to	exert	its	influence	through	the	shaping	of	meanings	attached	to	‘sound
economic	policy’.	This	involves	the	Fund	choosing	or	prioritising	which	economic	ideas	to	draw	on	to	inform	policy
recommendations,	and	the	yardsticks	by	which	policy	will	be	judged.
There	have	emerged,	ever	since	2010,	significant	differences	of	view	about	economic	policy	amongst	members	of
the	Troika	(EC,	ECB,	IMF)	engaged	in	the	European	programmes.	These	political	contestations	over	economic	ideas
have	their	roots	in	underlying	ideological	assumptions	about	the	efficacy	of	fiscal	policy.	They	have	been	difficult	to
contain	within	the	confines	of	a	façade	of	economic	policy	as	a	purely	technocratic	and	scientific	undertaking.
The	battleground	over	‘sound’	fiscal	policy
A	central	battleground	during	the	Eurozone	crisis	has	been	over	what	constitutes	‘sound’	and	‘unsound’	fiscal	policy,
with	the	ECB,	the	German	Finance	Minister	and	others	often	calling	for	more	powers	to	enforce	budgetary	austerity.
The	IMF	mobilised	its	knowledge	bank	and	scientific	reputation	to	correct	what	key	Fund	figures	saw	as	mistaken
premises	of	austerity	policies.
Fund	research	into	higher	fiscal	multipliers	proved	influential	in	the	depths	of	the	Great	Recession.	The	IMF,	along
with	some	European	governments,	pressed	the	case	for	slower,	less	harsh	fiscal	consolidation	to	protect	growth	as
the	Eurozone	economies	struggled	to	recover.	IMF	support	for	French	calls	to	loosen	the	strictures	of	the	Stability
and	Growth	Pact	was	an	important	factor	in	the	European	Commission’s	more	lenient	approach	to	delaying	deficit
reduction.
The	IMF	also	counselled	against	precipitate	exit	from	stimulus,	debunked	the	notion	that	fiscal	consolidation	is	in
itself	‘growth	friendly’,	and	underlined	that	fiscal	consolidation	can	be	self-defeating.	As	the	recession	in	the
Eurozone	drew	on,	the	IMF	advised	further	counter-cyclical	fiscal	policy	interventions	to	support	the	recovery.	The
Fund’s	empirically-backed	policy	advice	advocated	a	‘less	now,	more	later’	approach	to	consolidation	for	those	with
fiscal	space.
Firewalls,	banking	union,	and	breaking	the	‘doom	loop’
Another	key	ongoing	point	of	difference	is	over	how	to	rebuild	European	financial	stability	and	credibility.	The	IMF
called	relentlessly	for	the	muscular	use	of	public	power,	the	Eurozone	architecture,	and	central	bank	actions	to	limit
financial	market	contagion.	IMF	research	consistently	underlined	the	take-home	point	from	the	financial	and
Eurozone	crises:	financial	stability	needs	to	be	more	actively	nurtured	and	sustained	by	governments,	by	central
banks,	and	by	bodies	like	the	IMF.	It	cannot	be	taken	for	granted.	As	Lagarde	puts	it,	‘we	must	keep	our	financial
systems	safe	by	avoiding	a	rollback	of	the	regulatory	framework	put	in	place	since	the	global	financial	crisis	to	boost
capital	and	liquidity	buffers.’
The	ECB,	the	German	government	and	others	saw	bail-outs,	ECB	bond-buying	and	the	building	of	firewalls	in	‘moral
hazard’	terms.	This	was	tantamount	to	letting	profligate	governments	off	the	hook	and	throwing	good	money	after
bad.	They	saw	market	pressure	which	under-developed	‘backstops’	prolonged	as	a	spur	to	necessary
competitiveness-enhancing	reforms	and	fiscal	discipline.	The	IMF	have	consistently	hoped	that	banking	union	could
reduce	financial	systemic	risks	by	breaking	the	‘doom	loop’	between	fragile	financial	institutions	and	over-burdened
sovereigns.	Yet	Fund	aspirations	for	‘full’	banking	union	foundered	due	to	a	lack	of	support	from	European	partners,
the	European	Commission,	and	the	ECB.
The	limits	of	IMF	‘traction’	and	influence	in	Europe
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This	highlights	a	consistent	theme	–	the	limits	of	IMF	influence,	despite	its	central	role	in	Eurozone	crisis	responses
through	the	Troika.	In	the	formulation	of	European	programmes,	the	Fund	argued	unsuccessfully	with	Troika	partners
for	upfront	debt	restructuring,	and	lower	levels	of	fiscal	consolidation.	On	both	fronts,	the	Fund’s	failure	to	prevail
deepened	the	crisis,	especially	for	Greece.	Overall,	the	IMF	has	had	limited	impact	on	the	austerity-centric	policy
settings	of	European	authorities	and	governments.	Its	persistent	calls	for	systemic	risk-reducing	strengthened	fiscal
and	financial	backstops	for	the	Eurozone	have	gone	largely	unanswered.	Given	the	limits	of	the	IMF’s	influence	on
European	economic	policies,	there	are	grounds	to	doubt	the	durability	of	Europe’s	economic	and	financial	stability.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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